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Response to Susan McReynolds’ review of Rowan Williams, Dostoevsky: 
Language, Faith, and Fiction, By Paul J. Contino
Although Susan McReynolds’ review comes three years after the 
publication of Archbishop Rowan Williams’ book, it is quite timely. 
Susan helpfully summarizes the positive reception Williams’s book has 
received since its publication, and graciously invites Williams to now 
enter into “a conversation [with] members of the International 
Dostoevsky Society.” One hopes that the daily demands of serving as 
leader of the worldwide Anglican Communion will allow him to do so -  
perhaps at the International Symposium in Moscow in 2013? As one of 
the reviewers who praised Williams’ book upon its publication, I am 
grateful that she has invited me into the very kind of dialogue that 
Williams, building upon Bakhtin, emphasizes as vital toward under­
standing Dostoevsky’s novelistic art, and to our human flourishing.
I agree with one of Susan’s early criticisms: Williams could certainly 
engage other leading literary commenters of Dostoevsky, especially those 
that explore his religious dimension. To those whom she mentions I 
would add her own recent work on Dostoevsky’s response to atonement 
theory, Redemption and the Merchant God, and Robert Louis Jackson’s 
pioneering work on form. However, I would add that Williams’s book has 
also alerted me to a number of commentators whose work I now intend to 
explore.
In response to Williams’s discussion of Dostoevsky’s Orthodox 
sources, Susan asks: “Is some putative reconstructed authorial intent the 
measure of significance in a literary text? We are dealing with novels, 
after all, and not theological treatises....” Here I am pretty sympathetic to 
Williams. It is vital to understand Dostoevsky’s theological intentions, 
especially in his final novel, of which Dostoevsky wrote to his editor : “I 
shall compel [his contemporary atheists] to recognize that a pure, ideal 
Christian is not something abstract but is graphically real, possible, 
obviously present....” (Letter to N. A. Lyubimov, June 11, 1879). But the 
centrality of Dostoevsky’s theological concerns does not -  as Williams is 
consistently aware -  make The Brothers Karamazov a treatise, but, rather 
an artistic work that bears comparison with Dante’s Commedia or Bach’s 
St. Matthew Passion, In Book 5, Dostoevsky sought to make the best case 
for atheism that he could. For some, like James Wood, Ivan’s 
“unanswerable attack on the cruelty of God’s hiddenness . . . .  proved 
decisive,” and provided his final step to atheism (Broken Estate 270). But 
in Dostoevsky’s response to Ivan, he did not intend to write a “point by
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point answer, but an oblique one. . . .  in artistic form” (Letter to К. P. 
Pobedonostsev, August 24,1879).
Williams attends to this form, and discerns that Dostoevsky’s 
dialogical art is fundamentally Christological. Here Williams picks up 
where Bakhtin felt compelled to leave off. As Bakhtin told an Sergey 
Bocharov near the end of his life, under Soviet surveillance he “couldn’t 
speak directly about the main questions. . . . What Dostoevsky agonized 
about all his life -  the existence of God” (cited in Bakhtin and Religion, 
“Introduction” 2). Williams -  who knows the Orthodox tradition deeply -  
points to these influences to show “Dostoevsky carefully finding his way 
between tradition and modernity” (205). Perhaps, as Susan suggests, 
Williams overemphasizes Dostoevsky’s Orthodoxy. From my vantage 
point, he could acknowledge more fully Dostoevsky’s ecumenical 
potentialities. He rightly observes that Dostoevsky could be “specta­
cularly pigheaded” about Roman Catholicism (14), but one might note 
that numerous Catholic literary artists and theologians (and Anglo- 
Catholics like Williams) have found great spiritual sustenance in 
Dostoevsky’s narratives: Georges Bernanos, Walker Percy, Henri de 
Lubac, Hans Urs von Balthasar -  and even the two most recent Pontiffs, 
who cite Dostoevsky in their encyclicals! When considering Dosto­
evsky’s Catholic dimension, it’s worth recalling his deep friendship with 
the younger, more ecumenically-inclined Soloviev, who helped arrange 
for the gift that Dostoevsky perhaps treasured most: the copy of Raphael’s 
“Sistine Madonna,” which hung in his study. The “thoroughgoing 
sacramental theology. . . of the Eastern Church” (75) is shared by the 
Catholic West.
Dostoevsky’s profound influence on numerous Christians -  Catholic, 
Orthodox, and Protestant (notably Karl Barth) -  offers evidence that 
Williams is not projecting, a la Feuerbach, when he reads Dostoevsky. 
More than any literary work I know. The Brothers Karamazov offers a 
complex, capacious case for the integral nature of the two-fold 
commandment at the heart of small “o” orthodox Christianity: love of 
God and love of neighbor as oneself. Zosima’s prescription of the “harsh 
and dreadful” path of active love (which Dorothy Day took so dearly to 
heart), his depiction of the difficulty of serving as a “monk in the world,” 
remains constant in its inspiration to and relevance in a world that 
questions -  perhaps even more fiercely than Ivan -  the possibility of 
persons to enact “Christ-like love.” Dostoevsky’s contemporaries said to 
him, “We’ve become better people because of the Karamazovs” (Letter to 
Anna G. Dosotyevskaya, June 7, 1880) ; many continue to say it. The
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spiritually transformative potential of this novel can never, in my view, be 
underestimated.
But is Williams sufficiently attentive to historical difference? Is the 
God that he discerns in Dostoevsky simply an ideal therapist, the 
projection of twenty-first century wish? Well, not if one recognizes that, 
in Dostoevsky’s analogical imagination, a character like Alyosha -  that 
“spiritual therapist,” to borrow Robin Feuer Miller’s words ( Worlds 86) -  
is an image of Christ. Like the penetrating gaze of the Sinai icon of 
Christ Pantocrator, the words and visage of Zosima and Alyosha offer 
both gift and task, grace and a call to responsibility. They lend “loving 
attention” (26) to use a phrase that Williams aptly employs. Two 
Sundays ago, I led a reading group discussion of the novel in our local 
Catholic parish after Mass. The Gospel reading that morning was John 9, 
Christ’s meeting and dialogue with the Samaritan woman at the well. 
“Come see the man who has told me everything that I have done,” says 
the faltering woman-tumed-apostle near the end of the story. The image 
of this gospel dialogue of transformation resonates in scenes like 
Zosima’s with his mysterious visitor, and Alyosha’s with Grushenka, as 
so much of scripture does throughout the novel.
But Susan raises another vital question: Does Williams’ celebration 
of dialogue entail a refusal to come to closure? After all, Christ often 
concludes spiritual interventions with clear words of closure: “Go and sin 
no more” (John 8.11). At first, I was inclined to agree with Neuhaus’s 
implied critique of Williams’s “dialogical enmity toward every form of 
closure,” his seeming allergy to any “last word.” After all, don’t 
therapeutic dialogue and sacramental confession both seek closure? 
Doesn’t the beauty of Christ -  especially in the Sinai icon -  balance 
mercy with judgment? Reading Bakhtin’s work as a whole, one can see 
that his early emphasis (in his early Toward a Philosophy o f the Act) upon 
“signature” -  the need to take responsibility for one’s deeds -  and his 
critique of the vicious cycle of the loophole (in Problems o f Dostoevsky’s 
Poetics) balances his affirmation of unfinalizability.
However, upon closer reading, it becomes clear that Williams does 
not celebrate openness uncritically. For one thing, he insists upon the 
ethical failures of those who resist the closure forged through decision 
and commitment. His remarkably severe critique of Myshkin points up 
the prince’s reductive benevolence, his “will to believe [of others] less of 
them than is actually true” (50). Myshkin’s refusal to recognize “the 
obstacles and limits of the everyday” (51) pushes him further from the 
incamational and closer to the demonic. So too Stavrogin, who underlines
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“the paralyzing effect of freedom without decision and commitment” 
(93), and Ivan, who “wants to slip away from the words he speaks, so as 
to remain hidden, free from what he has said” (127).
To further clarify Williams’s complex approach to openness and 
closure, it’s helpful to underline two recurring emphases in his study: 
realism vs. voluntarism, and the way eternal life becomes integral to 
Dostoevsky’s mature faith. First realism. As do I, Williams sees in 
Dostoevsky the vision of a metaphysical realist: “he is repeatedly 
directing us toward a pattern of divine action that is outside our heads or 
hearts” (234). The emphasis here is less epistemological than ontological. 
God’s gratuitous and abundant love remains the hidden ground of our 
being. Our call is to recognize this ground and respond in trust and 
gratitude. In laceration, we can willfully refuse his gift: God grants 
humans freedom. But, paradoxically, freedom can only be realized when 
the person receptively conforms to the reality of God’s sustaining love. 
Thus, Dostoevsky’s vision stands opposed to any voluntarist view: reality 
is not a construction of capricious, competing human wills in which 
“there is nowhere and no one to which or to whom fidelity can be given, 
no source outside the will from which difference, otherness, can be 
absorbed in a renewal of life or energy” (220).
Given the reality of difference, and the way the wrong kind of “last 
words” can reify reality, Dostoevsky’s realism is necessarily perspectival 
and dialogical. Thus, as Williams rightly recalls, “the deplorable Rakitin 
has published a life of Zosima, as if to remind us that there will always be 
an alternative story to be told” (137). However, Williams could here make 
clearer that some perspectives are closer to the truth than others. Certainly 
Alyosha sees and “authors” Zosima more clearly than Rakitin does! In 
Book 7, we see the way Alyosha discerns the events at Grushenka’s as the 
unexpected miracle they are, whereas Rakitin sneers and dismisses them. 
Alyosha is a believing realist who recognizes miracles as integral to the 
weave of reality; Rakitin is an unbelieving realist who denies miracles 
even when they unfurl before his eyes. This side of eternity, all 
perspectives pass through a glass darkly. But Zosima’s and, over time, 
Alyosha’s come very close to seeing face to face.
Here I come to Williams’s second recurring emphasis: his observation 
that immortality is integral to Dostoevsky’s understanding of faith in 
God: “Dostoevsky projects the idea of a continuation of growth and self­
definition beyond death” (133-34). But how can this be? Isn’t eternity 
non-temporal, non-narrative, simply static? On the contrary, it’s most 
fully alive. Allow me to extend Williams’s idea: if eternity is participation
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of human life within the Triune God -  that infinitely loving Divine 
conversation iconically imaged in Rublev’s Trinity -  such dialogue is, in 
fact, unending, without a final word. (Recall the repeated “three’s” in 
Dostoevsky’s final novel.) Fully conforming to the reality of God’s love, 
such dialogue of creatures within Creator would be perfectly free, 
unblighted by sideward glances or lacerating rebellions. And eternal 
dialogue is not reserved for heaven: in the hell described by Zosima, God 
continues to “call.” It’s hell with a loophole, as I sometimes like to call it.
Williams’s prose can be dense, and he might have articulated more 
clearly the way the Dostoevsky balances the closure demanded by realism 
with the reality of unending dialogue. Further, while I clearly share 
Williams’s sense that theological matters are at the heart of Dostoevsky 
artistic vision, I appreciate the point made by Susan and others that 
Williams might attend more fully to the literary aspects of the novel. 
Flere one recalls, for example, the rhyming chimes of imagery so 
elegantly noted in Robin Miller’s commentary.
But as someone one who has also written on the Christological 
dimension of Dostoevsky’s work (and who has now been inspired by 
Williams to consider more fully the Trinitarian), I can happily apply 
Williams’s description of “the iconic other” to his own book: It serves as 
“a presence that offers to nourish and augment what I am” (208). Like 
others, I will gratefully turn to it again, and look forward to continuing 
dialogue.
